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1 Introduction
For many years, academics and governments have been interested in the effects of environ-
mental policy on the location decisions of firms (Ulph 2000). One focus for this interest has
been the Pollution Havens Hypothesis (PHH). This hypothesis is concerned with the effects
of changes in the severity of pollution regulation on plant location decisions and trade flows
(Eskeland and Harrison 2003; Copeland and Taylor 2004). It remains an open empirical
question whether pollution control costs are important enough to measurably influence trade
and investment, both because the PHH operates on different levels in different contexts, and
because of limitations of data that have restricted the modeling of a firm’s location decision.
Yet this is a very important question, particularly for climate change policy. Policymakers
concerned with addressing climate change might consider regulations that make it more
costly for firms to emit greenhouse gases, so as to reduce total emissions. However, if the
PHH is a valid concern, climate change regulationsmight cause firms to relocate their activity
to another country with less stringent regulations (“carbon leakage”: Fischer and Fox 2012;
Elliot and Fullerton 2014), whilst reducing economic activity in the initial host country. As
greenhouse gases are a global pollutant, carbon leakage reduces the effectiveness of domestic
climate policy.
This paper takes advantage of a unique dataset of EU firm relocations in order to add to the
empirical evidence on the potential economic impact of climate policies, by considering the
relationship between industrial electricity prices at the country level and the location deci-
sions made by internationally-mobile firms. Thus we see this investigation as a contribution
to the PHH literature and to on-going policy discussions about carbon leakage risks. The
data, described below, lends itself to modeling firm location decisions in a discrete choice
framework where firms choose where to locate among a choice set of potential destina-
tion countries. This modelling framework is based on the approach originally developed in
McFadden (1974). In order to model firm behavior in this way, we use country-level char-
acteristics to serve as the choice attributes; these are described in the data section below. We
then explore the effects of potential future changes to environmental regulation by examin-
ing the response of firms to changes in a country’s electricity prices, as these often embody
a large proportion of climate mitigation policy costs. The added costs of climate policies
have impacts on different parts of the electricity supply system, ranging from generation to
transmission. The magnitude of these added costs resulting from climate policies such as
carbon taxes, cap-and-trade schemes and mandatory renewable energy targets varies across
countries, partly according to the commercial and regulatory structure of their electricity sys-
tems, and it is difficult to separate the effects of such climate policies from other electricity
price drivers such as domestic regulatory regimes, competition, electricity import and export
options and historic investments in alternative electricity generation sources. Despite these
limitations, we believe that final electricity prices to industrial consumers are a reasonable
proxy for the added costs of climate mitigation policy. If firms react in a similar way to
increased pollution costs as they would to an increase in electricity prices, then variations in
electricity prices can be used as a proxy for variations in climate policy stringency.
Two models are investigated. The first is conditioned on firms having already decided to
re-locate, so that the choice to be explained is where they will decide to move to. The second
expands the choice process to include the decision as to whether to re-locate or stay, as well
as where to move. We are particularly interested in whether there is a symmetric effect of
higher electricity costs on firms thinking about moving out of a country compared to firms
thinking about moving in; since any asymmetry would be important from a policy viewpoint.
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We are also interested in comparing the elasticity of firm response to an increase in electricity
costs between high- and low-energy intensity sectors, since a priori one would expect highly
energy-intensive sectors to be more sensitive to variations in electricity prices.
After reviewing the previous literature in the next section, we discuss our data in Sect. 3.
Section 4 discusses the conditional relocation model and results, and Sect. 5 presents the
unconditional relocation model. Section 6 investigates firm heterogeneity, and Sect. 7 con-
cludes. Themain results of the empirical analysis are that electricity costs do play a significant
role in determining relocation destinations, but also that effect is asymmetric between firms
moving into and out of a country, and between high and low energy intensity sectors.
2 Environmental Policy, Energy Costs and Firm Location: An Overview
of the Literature
Historically, the theoretical and empirical literatures on firm competiveness and location
decisions of plants contains two distinct strands: one related to the costs associated with
environmental regulation (the pollution haven hypothesis), and another related to the impact
of energy costs on the location of firms as part of factor proportion models where trade flows
are determined by relative factor endowments. In this context, energy prices were used in the
literature as a proxy for endowment with energy resources.
2.1 General Overview of PHH Literature
According to Eskeland and Harrison (2003), “the pollution haven hypothesis is, perhaps,
best seen as a corollary to the theory of comparative advantage: as pollution control costs
begin tomatter for some industries in some countries, other countries should gain comparative
advantage in those industries, if pollution control costs are lower there (for whatever reason).”
Baumol and Oates (1988), Pearson (1987), Wilson (1996), Ulph (1997), Rauscher (1994,
1997, 2000), List and Mason (2001), Verbeke and Clerq (2002), and Conrad (2005) develop
different theoretical models that illustrate the problem.
Empirical testing of the PHH has not yielded conclusive results, partly because of some of
the empirical difficulties facing the analyst. These include developing appropriate measures
of regulatory stringency, dealing with unobserved heterogeneity at the country or state level,
and possible simultaneity concerns between FDI (or some other measure of economic perfor-
mance) and regulatory stringency (Brunnermeier and Levinson 2004). Copeland and Taylor
(2004) undertake a review of the pre-2002 literature and conclude that most early studies
found little evidence of the pollution haven effect using cross-section estimation techniques,
due in part to the econometric issues noted above, but that studies which use more robust esti-
mation and panel data were more likely to find a significant PHH effect. Brunnermeier and
Levinson (2004) also concluded that “studies that…control for unobserved heterogeneity,
or …control for endogeneity find statistically significant pollution haven effects of reason-
able magnitude.” (page 6) Other studies such as Jeppesen et al. (2002) and Ben Kheder and
Zugravu (2008) also find a negative relationship between the stringency of environmental
regulation and plant location decisions. In contrast, Eskeland andHarrison (2003) find that the
empirical relationship between location and abatement expenditures is “not..robust”, whilst
Millimet and List (2004) found heterogeneous effects of environmental regulatory burdens
on plant start-up and exits for US county-level data.
The PHH literature has followed developments in international trade theory, with factor
endowment aspects commonly controlled for in earlier studies. Agglomeration metrics have
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been added in later studies such asWagner and Timmins (2009). Firm re-location in response
to variations in the costs ofmeeting environmental regulations can also be linked to the effects
of variations in regulatory burden onForeignDirect Investment flows between countries (Cole
and Elliott 2005; Buch et al. 2005). Both Wagner and Timmins (2009) and Cole and Elliott
(2005) show variation in responsiveness to environmental regulation by sector. The former
shows the sensitivity of the chemicals sector (relative to metals and pulp and paper sectors)
in terms of the relationship between location decisions and environmental burdens, whereas
the latter underlines differentiated results by capital intensity.
2.2 Energy Costs and Location Decisions
Ratti et al. (2011) use individual firm data from 15 European countries across 25 industries
over the period 1991–2006 to show a negative effect of energy prices on investment, with
manufacturing sectors particularly sensitive to these effects. Ben Kheder and Zugravu (2008)
use electricity price data in a study of location decisions made by French firms between 1996
and 2002. Their conditional logit specification includes market potential variables such as
GDP, population size and distance from other important markets, as well as labour and
capital costs. Other variables include an Environmental Regulation Index built on the basis
of information of international environmental agreements ratified, the energy efficiency of
output and general investment friendliness indices such as corruption and the rule of law.
Findings suggest that investment decisions are negatively related to fuel prices.
A forecasting exercise based on empirical evidence by Broeren et al. (2014) focuses on
the location of chemical plants on basis of the costs of production. Energy prices, especially
natural gas andother primary energy, constitute oneof themain drivers for plant location along
with the cost of transport and technology requirements. In the case of chlorine production,
the cost of electricity is particularly important. The study concludes that by 2030 as much
as 60% of basic chemicals production will be located in non-OECD countries, due to lower
energy costs. In the context of non-industrialised countries, where higher energy consumption
is associated with energy subsidies, the impact of energy prices on FDI has indirectly been
tested as part of the extensive literature dealing with the interaction of energy consumption,
FDI and economic growth. Lavric (2013) produced a study that focused on the countries from
where industry relocates and on the existing evidence of the impact of electricity charges
on relocations from the EU manufacturing sectors using the ERM database. She shows
significant effects of a number of factors evoked in the wider trade literature, but does not
find evidence that higher electricity charges are linked to a higher incidence of relocation
events in any sectors other than possibly the food sector.
A number of studies have recently been undertaken to determine the effect of increased
electricity prices on industrial competitiveness in the European Union. These studies1 have
been undertaken both as part of the discussion on EU Emissions Trading Scheme allowance
auctioning, as well as in relation to the impacts of setting renewable energy targets. Individ-
ual Member States such as Germany and the UK, where the cost of emissions reductions is
generally included in the cost of electricity supply, have also commissioned studies to deter-
mine the competitiveness impacts of increased electricity prices on domesticmanufacturing.2
Martin et al. (2014) produced a novel exercise of assessing the risk of carbon leakage from
European EU ETS firms by using a new approach to surveying industry aimed at reducing
response biases. The authors find that the currently applied EU ETS method of preventing
1 For example, Öko-Institute.V. and Ecofys (2013).
2 For example, ICF (2012) and Frontier Economics and EWI (2010).
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carbon leakage amounts to considerable over-compensation. Commins et al. (2011) use of
cross-country firm level panel data, for a large sample of European companies. They assess
the effect of energy taxes and the introduction of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on
employment, investment and productivity between 1996 and 2007. The authors find that
both the magnitude and sign of results dramatically between sectors; total factor productivity
accelerates with higher carbon taxes in some sectors and decelerates in others; energy taxes
lead to a net reduction in employment reduce employment and to increased investments as
well as a shift in investment patterns across sectors.
In conclusion, a number of literatures have investigated the theoretical and empirical links
between environmental policy, energy costs and firm location choices. However, there are
few clear messages that emerge from this body of work. Research which provides additional
insight into these linkages would thus seem worthwhile. In what follows, we first describe
the data used in our study, before setting out the modelling approach and results. The main
research questions investigated are these: at the firm level, can we observe an effect of
variations in electricity prices on firms’ decisions whether to stay or move? Is this effect
symmetrical for those moving into versus out of a country? And how does the responsiveness
of firms to energy costs varywith the energy intensity of the sector withinwhich they operate?
3 Data
The present study makes use of EU-wide data to study the responsiveness of large man-
ufacturing firms to changes in electricity prices across countries. Our primary data comes
from Eurofound’s European Restructuring Monitor (ERM), which conducts a comprehen-
sive screening of press and online news sources in the European Union (EU) to collect data
on firm restructuring. An “event” is included in the dataset if it involves the destruction or
creation of at least 100 jobs, or at least 10% of the workforce at sites employing more than
250 people. We focus on events from the ERM that involve the relocation of manufacturing
activity from within the EU to another country, either within or outside of the EU. We model
this relocation decision in a discrete choice framework, with the choice set defined as the
set of possible destination countries to which a firm can relocate. In this way we investigate
which factors drive the firms’ relocation decisions, focusing on their responsiveness to costs
of energy inputs, since this may give an indication of how firmswill respond to environmental
regulations that drive up their energy costs.
The industrial sectors included in the dataset are given in Table 1, and descriptive statistics
of the size of the relocations are given in Table 2. We drop observations which do not tell us
the specific destination country. We also treat as independent events any firm relocation that
Table 1 Sample of sectors
observed
Number of firms
Manufacture of computer and electronics 90
Manufacture of electrical equipment 113
Manufacture of motor vehicles 102
Manufacture of food products 37
Manufacture of chemicals 31
Manufacture of rubber and plastics 31
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 22
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Table 2 Summary statistics
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Size of relocation events
Jobs affected 634 294.3 323.9 30 3200
2012 destination country characteristics
GDP (billions $) 57 1102 2506 7.253 16,245
Tax rate (% of commercial profits) 57 42.74 16.68 7.4 107.5
GDP per capita ($) 57 26,076 24,520 1503 106,023
EU member 57 .42 .498 0 1
Price of electricity (cents/kWh) 57 0.122 .0599 .022 .292
The GDP, GDP per capita, and tax rate data come from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”
catalogue. The tax rate used is from the data series “Total tax rate (%of commercial profits)”whichmeasures the
amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses after accounting for allowable deductions
and exemptions as a share of commercial profits. It has a max above 100% because in 2012, Argentina had a
reported total tax rate above 100%
involved shifting manufacturing production to multiple destination countries. After cleaning
this data, we are left with 634 observations of relocations over the period 2002–2013. For
each relocation, we observe the firm name, year of relocation, country of origin, country of
destination, industry sector, and the number of jobs affected. The relocation events are shown
graphically in Fig. 1 by origin-destination pairs.
There are some limitations to this relocation dataset. Given the criteria for inclusion in
the dataset, there is a firm size bias as the dataset will include almost exclusively medium to
large sized firms. In addition, variability in national coverage of restructuring events would
lead to an uneven representation across the EU. Despite these limitations, this data is unique
as an EU-wide dataset of large-scale restructuring and relocation events. Other data that
are crucial for our investigation are energy prices. We compiled a consistent time series of
end-user electricity prices for industry from several sources. Most of the data on electricity
prices come from the International Energy Agency (IEA). The IEA provides data for OECD
countries and select non-OECD countries, but does not include all countries that are relevant
to our study. For these countries we obtain electricity prices from Enerdata. For the few
countries that do not have end-use electricity prices for industry available in either of these
sources, we obtained prices from either the national power company of that country or a
published research article on the electricity market of the relevant country.3 Note that the
prices of other fuels used by industry (such as fuel oil and natural gas) are not included in the
dataset, due to gaps in data coverage for several countries to which relocations are important.
We discuss the implications of omitting these substitute prices below and in the Conclusions.
3 Indeed for some of the non-OECD countries, the price of electricity time series is quite incomplete, with a
few countries having only 1 data point. We use linear interpolation and extrapolation to complete the dataset,
that is we fill in missing years that have prior and future observations by fitting a linear trend, while missing
values at the beginning or end of the sample are fit to a linear trend of the two closest observations. Alternatively,
we also calculated the annual average percent change in electricity prices from the observed data, and used this
to impute the missing values for particular countries, assuming that energy prices in a country might follow
global trends to some degree. The results were almost exactly identical for both methods, suggesting that the
imputation of missing values does not drive our results. As a final robustness check, we perform the analysis
only using countries for which we have very completely series of prices over the sample period. These results
are presented in Table 5, and again show similar results.
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Fig. 1 Relocation flows from the EU, as recorded by the European Relocation Monitor for January 2002 to
June 2013
Our discrete choice framework requires other country-level attributes, which will serve
to control for country characteristics that might influences a firm’s relocation decision. We
obtain bilateral trade data from the Eurostat COMEXT database. This is to capture the
idea that for a domestic firm that is relocating, the choice among two alternative countries
may be influenced by the amount of trade between the domestic country and each of the
potential destinations. A high value of exports of a product category (in our case a NACE
2 category) to a country can indicate an attractive market for the exported product. A high
value of imports may serve as an indication of the exporter’s competitive advantage, caused
by lower factor costs and agglomeration effects. TheWorldBank provides other country-level
attributes for most of our destination countries, including a complete time series of GDP for
the countries in our study. GDP, as a measure of market size, is commonly used in empirical
studies based on gravity international trade model and is also used in the PHH literature, e.g.
Smarzynska and Wei (2001). This is typically used in conjunction with measures of distance
and “virtual” distance such as differences in language (e.g. Head and Mayer 2004). Both
distances between countries and language differences are included in our modelling as part
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of the costs of moving. Labour costs are a variable commonly used in empirical PHH and
wider trade literature, e.g. Millimet and List (2004) and Buch et al. (2005). Unfortunately, no
consistent and comprehensive time series on country-specific labour costs could be found,
so that cross-country variations in labour costs are only included via the time-unvarying
country fixed effects. Finally, the World Bank collects time series data on the total tax rate
for businesses in each country, measured as a percentage of total commercial profits.
Other sources provide many of the country-specific attributes we use in the choice model.
TheCIAWorld Factbook provides data on tax rates and unemployment rates for each country.
Head and Mayer (2004) find that corporate taxation carries a negative, large coefficient
in their study of location decisions of Japanese car manufacturers in Europe. The Quality
of Government Institute has compiled a dataset that for each country measures indices of
quality of government institutions, perceived corruption, levels of infrastructure and quality
of education. These variables are commonly used in the trade literature and are included as
proxies for the cost of trade. The quality of infrastructure emerges as a significant variable
in the review of the PHH literature by Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004); this is also used
in Wagner and Timmins (2009) and others.
4 Modelling Approach: Relocation Choice
Discrete choice models are used to describe decision makers’ choices between alternatives
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). The decision makers can be individuals, households, firms,
or government agencies, but in order to fit into the discrete choice framework the decision
maker must face a finite, exhaustive, and mutually exclusive set of choices where only one
alternative is chosen on each choice occasion. The firm relocation data from the European
Restructuring Monitor includes the destination choice of individual manufacturing plants,
making it particularly well suited to a discrete choice framework, with firms choosing a
relocation destination from among the set of countries.
Earlier work has also used the discrete choice framework to study firm location decisions.
Manderson and Kneller (2012) use a probit model to study firms’ FDI response to environ-
mental regulation. As a robustness check, those authors use a multinomial logit model with
a choice set of the world divided into 10 regions (e.g. North America, Western Europe, etc.).
We use a multinomial logit model with countries as the choice set, and also account for the
varying moving costs between each pair of countries. Levinson (1996) uses data from the
Census ofManufacturers to estimate a conditional logit of plant relocations across U.S. states
in response to state-level characteristics including environmental regulations. Levinson finds
that the locations of branch plants of large firms are more sensitive to state characteristics
than plants in general; however, only a few of the coefficients on measures of environmental
stringency are statistically significant. Another early paper of firm entry in an oligopolistic
market is Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), which touched off the literature on firm entry games.
Although we see the relocation decisions of manufacturing firms in the data set used here,
they are all in different markets, and thus we do not model them as strategically interacting
and so do not build an entry game. We adopt an estimation strategy based on a model where
firms choose a country based on its characteristics, and taking moving costs into account. We
can then estimate the value of country-specific characteristics, such as the end-user price of
electricity in each country, to evaluate how important that is to each firm’s location decision.4
4 Some papers have extended these models to dynamic settings, for example Bayer et al. (2011) who present
a dynamic model of a household’s neighborhood location choice. However, because we do not observe the
same firm making multiple moves in the ERM relocation data, we maintain a static framework in this paper.
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4.1 Empirical Model
We model firm i’s decision to relocate a plant conditional on the firm deciding that it will
relocate to another country in a particular year. We provide a richer model that includes
the decision of whether to relocate or not in the next section. The firm chooses a country
j = 1, 2, . . . , J for each year t = 1, . . . , T (2002–2013). Because this choice is conditional
on relocation, each firm faces J − 1 alternatives, as we exclude the country of origin from
the choice set. Thus at each time period, each firm i = 1, . . . , N faces a reduced form profit
function:
πi j t = δ j + β1Price_elec jt + β2GDP jt + β3Tradei j t + β4Tax jt + i j t (1)
with a moving cost function
θ ′MCi j = θ1Disti j + θ2Langi j + θ3EUjt (2)
and where the mean profit term, δ j , serves as a country-specific fixed effect. In our specifi-
cation we define the following:
• Price_elec jt are the end-user electricity costs for industry in country j at year t
• GDP jt is the gross domestic product of country j in year t
• Tradei j t is a measure of bilateral trade between countries i and j in year t
• Tax jt is the total tax rate, measured as the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions
payable by businesses as a share of commercial profits in country j in year t
• X j are country specific attributes that do not vary with time
• Disti j is distance, measured as kilometers between countries i and j
• Langi j is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s country of origin has an official language
in common with j
• EUjt is a dummy variable for EU membership at time t
i j t is an i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value distributed shock. This is so that the choice probabilities
can be expressed in a closed form, which greatly facilitates estimation. The EU membership
indicator is included because there may be a different cost of relocating within the EU
compared to outside the EU, possibly due to differences in legal or regulatory regimes. The
per capital GDP is included to capture some indication of effective market demand. In some
specifications, we also include GDP per capita to approximate labor costs, but as it tends to
be correlated with total GDP for each country-year, it does not add much additional variation
and results remain similar.
4.2 Estimation
The destination-specific constant δ j captures time-invariant omitted variables, which may
be correlated with the error term. Thus, by adding this constant, we control for endogeneity
that might arise from time-invariant omitted variables. In estimation of the logit model, we
recover the coefficients on Price of Electricity, GDP, Trade, Taxes, and Moving Costs
(
β, θ ′
)
and the mean profit terms,
{
δ j
}
. The coefficient on moving costs is identified from variation
in the distances that firms from different origin counties would need to travel to relocate to
the various destination countries, while the other remaining parameters are identified by time
variation in their values.
The estimation is done via Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), on the likelihood
function generated by the multinomial logit model with alternative-specific constants. The
primary subtlety in our context comes from that fact that after deciding to relocate, each firm
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faces a choice set of all countries, excluding the country of origin; thus, firms originating
in different countries will face different choice sets. In specifications where we allow firms
to decide to remain in the country of origin, this manifests itself as the firms facing zero
“moving costs” when choosing the country of origin.
4.3 Identification
Our main parameter of interest is the coefficient on electricity prices. To give a sense of the
range of the electricity prices, consider end-user electricity prices in 2011. Russia has some of
the lowest prices at 4 US cents/kWh, while Japan is among the highest at 18 US cents/kWh;
most countries are within 8 and 16 US cents/kWh. For identification of the parameter on
electricity prices in our model, however, we rely on variation over time in the electricity
prices. Figure 2 shows the time series of electricity prices for a small subset of countries, and
gives an indication of the variation which we rely on for identification.
We assume that these price variations are exogenous, and thus uncorrelated with other
factors that might influence a firm’s relocation decision. A threat to identification would
be time-varying unobserved variables that are correlated with energy prices, as this would
bias our estimate for the parameter on the price of electricity. While there is no way we
can test directly for this correlation with time-varying unobservables, we can check if the
electricity prices in our data are correlated over time with any of the observed time-varying
variables. For most countries, the correlations between electricity prices and other variables
thatmight affect a firm’s relocation such as tax rates, EUmembership, and export variables are
weak (less than 0.6 in absolute value), giving some evidence in support of our identification
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Fig. 2 Time series of end-user electricity prices for industry
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assumptions. The variable that is most highly correlated with electricity price is GDP, with
the average country having a correlation coefficient for GDP and electricity prices of 0.74
over the sample period. Our assumption is that after controlling for GDP, per capita GDP,
and trade variables, there is no other unobserved variable that varies over time in a similar
way to electricity prices and influences firms’ relocation calculations.
One major limitation of our study is that we use only prices for end-user electricity, which
alone involved a great deal of difficulty in constructing the panel of data for our period of
study, and must exclude other fuel types. Potential biases from excluding other fuel types
come through two main channels. First, even if end-user electricity prices are uncorrelated
with other fuels such as natural gas and coal, these fuels may serve as substitutes in some
industries. Thus, the burden of an increase in electricity prices may not fall entirely on
increasing production costs, if part of this can be offset by switching fuel types. To the extent
that this occurs, our estimates for the effect of changing electricity prices on location decisions
are underestimates, as that price variation would be a dampened measure of the full effect of
firms experiencing increased costs.
A second channel through which excluding other fuel types yields biased results could
occur if the prices of different fuels were correlated. In this situation, the effect we attribute
to increasing electricity prices may indeed be due to price increases of other fuel types, and
we would have no way to distinguish those effects. Therefore, we may be over-stating the
effect due to electricity alone. In this case, we would do better to interpret the estimates as
indicative of the effects of movements in fuel prices more broadly on location decisions of
manufacturing firms.
4.4 Conditional Logit Model Results
In this section we first present the parameter estimates from the conditional logit model set
out above.We then use these estimates to investigate how changing end-user electricity prices
for industry affect the relocation decisions of manufacturing firms in the EU. The results from
the estimation are given in Table 3 for various model specifications. These estimates look
reasonable. The negative coefficient forDistance implies that a greater distance to destination
country reduces the probability of relocating to that country; the positive coefficients on EU
and Language suggest that this cost is slightly mitigated when moving to a country that is a
member of the EU or that has a common official languagewith the firm’s country of origin (eg
moving from Netherlands to Flanders). The negative parameter on Price_Electricity shows
that an increased price of electricity serves to discourage firms from relocating to a particular
country.
These parameter estimates allow us to calculate elasticities for our parameter of interest,
Price_Electricity. We denote by ηi j t the individual elasticity of Pi jt with respect to the price
of electricity, which given our type I extreme value assumption for i j t , gives us the formula
ηi j t ≡ d log Pi jt
d log Priceelec
= βprice Price_elec jt
(
1 − Pi jt
)
(3)
We aggregate these individual elasticities by taking a weighted average in order to arrive
at a global elasticity, which is reported at the bottom of Table 3 as ηprice.5 The demand
for relocating to any particular country in our sample appears to be less than unit elastic
with respect to the price of electricity, but certainly greater than zero. That is to say, firms are
sensitive to the price of electricity in a countrywhenmaking a relocation decision, conditional
5 Specifically, we use the formula ηprice =
∑
i j t ηi j t Pi j t∑
i j t Pi j t
.
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Table 3 Conditional relocation parameter estimates: where to move?
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Distance (100 thous. km) −60.7293** −55.9407** −56.0569** −56.0679**
(7.6569) (7.8033) (7.8249) (7.8379)
EU membership 0.1075 0.1054 0.1276
(0.2666) (0.2668) (0.2710)
Electricity price (US cents/kWh) −5.5532** −6.0839** −6.1455** −5.8426**
(2.3605) (2.4718) (2.4915) (2.5837)
GDP −0.0539 2.2174
(0.2782) (2.2895)
GDP per capita −2.4029
(2.2737)
Language 0.5373** 0.5374** 0.5367**
(0.1718) (0.1718) (0.1718)
Tax Rate 1.3783
(1.2344)
Trade −0.0683
(0.455)
ηprice 0.5325 0.5828 0.5888 0.5595
(0.2264) (0.2368) (0.2387) (0.2474)
N 634 634 634 634
The labelling of Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 refers solely to which right-hand side variables are
included in the estimation
Significance results are p ≤ .05 is ** and .05 < p ≤ .1 is *
on having decided to relocate. We also present this elasticity broken down by country for a
subsample of countries in Column 1 of Table 4. There are a few countries that approximate an
elasticity of 1, such as Austria and Japan with respective values of 0.84 and 0.85, indicating
that a 1% point change in the price of electricity in those countries would have a nearly
proportional % point effect on the share of countries relocating to those countries. China,
Canada, and Poland are all around 0.5, indicating that the share of firms relocating to those
countries is relatively less sensitive to energy prices. For inelastic cases such as Russia, with
an elasticity of 0.21, this is likely driven by the very low current and recent energy prices,
and the United States with 0.35 suggests that other factors are more important for decisions
to locate there. Column 2 of Table 4 shows the % decrease in the share of firms relocating to a
country if that country were to increase its price of electricity by $0.01/kWh. Most countries
experience between a 5–6% decrease in their share of relocating firms.
The vector
{
δ j
}J
j=1 is normalized to have mean zero. It is interesting to see how these
mean profit parameters vary across regions of the world, as depicted in Fig. 3. China has
the highest mean profit, and Asian countries on the whole are above average. Not all firms
relocate to Asia, however, because of the high travel costs that are paid for moving over
such a long distance. Thus, there is still a significant share of firms relocating to Western and
Eastern Europe, because although the mean profits are lower than in Asia and the Americas,
distance costs are also much lower. To illustrate the importance of the distance, we can
conduct a hypothetical counterfactual based on our parameter estimates. For example, we
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Table 4 Demand elasticity with
respect to electricity prices for a
selection of modelled countries
The first column shows elasticity
of demand with respect to price
elasticity. The second column
shows the % decrease in share of
firms choosing a country when
that country increases its price of
electricity by $0.01kWh
ηprice % Decrease
Austria 0.8413 5.63%
Brazil 0.7443 5.60
Canada 0.4000 5.66
China 0.4646 4.71
Croatia 0.5836 5.66
Czech Republic 0.5521 5.17
Denmark 0.5905 5.62
France 0.4649 5.51
Germany 0.5836 5.28
India 0.5521 5.48
Japan 0.8557 5.66
Poland 0.4640 4.93
Russia 0.2189 5.60
United Kingdom 0.5923 5.54
United States 0.3521 5.46
Fig. 3 Mean profit terms by region
can simulate the location decisions if China were located in Eastern Europe and thus had
much lower moving costs associated with it. In our sample, we see 15% of firms that relocate
go to China; under the counterfactual where China is “in” Eastern Europe, the share jumps
to almost 85%.
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Table 5 Conditional relocation parameter estimates: robustness to price interpolation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Distance (100 thous. km) − 53.245** − 47.338** − 47.987** − 48.045**
(8.417) (8.577) (8.605) (8.634)
EU membership −0.001 −0.0009 0.0342
(0.414) (0.415) (0.425)
Electricity price (US cents/kWh) − 5.486* − 6.065* −6.266* −5.907*
(3.106) (3.131) (3.141) (3.324)
GDP −0.231 2.343
(0.303) (2.926)
GDP per capita −2.720
(2.883)
Language 0.716** 0.715** 0.722**
(0.183) (0.183) (0.184)
Tax Rate −2.193
(1.596)
Trade −0.235
(0.515)
ηprice 0.540 0.600 0.602 0.588
(0.226) (0.237) (0.239) (0.247)
N 537 537 537 537
The labelling of Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 refers solely to which right-hand side variables
are included in the estimation. This table exactly replicates the main estimation from Table 3, but drops all
countries for which the electricity price had to be interpolated. At the cost of some statistical power and
precision, this robustness test shows similar effects as before
Significance results are p ≤ .05 is ** and .05 < p ≤ .1 is *
We investigated alternative specifications to test for robustness of these results. Since firms
might havemade the decision to relocate in advance of the announcement date that is recorded
in our data, we estimated the model using lagged electricity price. When prices are lagged by
one year, the parameter estimates are nearly identical and still significant, and the elasticities
are of the same magnitude. With electricity prices are lagged by two years, the parameter
estimates become smaller and are only significant at the 90% level. We also attempted to
model the effect of the firm responding to the relative price between the destination country
and the country of origin by weighting the electricity prices by the price in the home country.
In this specification, however, the coefficient on price of electricity was smaller and no longer
statistically significant. As an additional robustness check, because of limited price data for
some locations, we repeat the analysis using only those countries for which a complete price
data is available. These results, shown in Table 5, show similar results to the main analysis,
albeit at the cost of some precision in estimates due to smaller sample size.
5 Nested Logit Relocation Model: The Decision to Move and Where to
Move
The previous section modeled firm location choice conditional on having already decided to
relocate. However, for a policy maker the more interesting question is to what degree climate
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change policies affect a firm’s decision to relocate or not, as well as the choice of destination
for firms that do decide to move their production activity. In this section, we approximate
the total number of manufacturing firms in the EU in order to expand our model to include
the participation decision. This allows for a more complete picture of plant relocation and
is useful for giving a more meaningful examination of the effects of climate change policies
which drive up energy costs.
To do this, we approximate the share of firms that relocate by using an estimate of the
total number of medium and large manufacturing firms in the EU.We obtained from Eurostat
estimates of the number of manufacturing firm with 250+ employees for each country in the
EU, since the ERM data only captures relocations of medium to large firms that involve
significant job loss. The Eurostat data on firm size distribution for 2012 is the most complete,
and so we use those numbers which suggest a total of 15,833 manufacturing firms across the
EU with 250+ employees, and we have also the distribution of the location of these firms
across EU countries. These numbers suggest a very small share of firms relocate. In our
empirical application, we assume that each year over our 12 year sample period, 10% of
the large firms in each country are faced with the decision of whether to relocate or not, and
if they decide to relocate, to where to relocate. This is to ease the computational burden of
estimation, and also to incorporate that large firms are not considering relocation at every
moment. This means that our preferred specification will have N = 1500 decision makers in
each year, and for robustness, we report estimates for various sizes of this share.
With data on the total numbers of firms (and thus also the share that relocate), we can
extend themodel where firms have two stages of decisionmaking. First, firms decide whether
tomove or not. After deciding tomove, a firm then decides which destination country tomove
to. The current setup will be a static framework, so firms are not making decisions taking
into account expectations of future states. Rather, here firms are modeled as exogenously
having the opportunity to move at each time period t, where if a firm decides to relocate from
country i to country j it receives:
πi j t = δ j + β1Price_elec jt + β2GDP jt + β3Tradei j t + θ ′MCi j + i j t (4)
with a moving cost
θ ′MCi j = θ1Disti j + θ2Langi j + θ3EUjt (5)
While if a firm decides to stay, it receives the mean utility (profits) for its country of origin,
δorigin and does not pay the moving cost, so it receives:
πi0t = δorigin + β1Price_elecorigin,t + β2GDPorigin,t + i j t (6)
We model the firm decision as first deciding whether to relocate or not, and then only after a
decision to relocate, the firm chooses a country of destination. This model requires that we
impose a nesting structure, so that the country of origin is in one (degenerate) nest, and all
the other countries are in another nest. The error term i j t is assumed to be distributed type 1
extreme value, but rather than being independent across all choice, there is now correlation
among alternatives in the same nest; this allows us to still calculate the choice probabilities,
Pi jt in a closed form.6 Estimation of the parameters follows using essentially the same
method as before, with the additional estimation of the moving cost constant θ1 and a nesting
parameter, λmove . This provides a more complete picture in any counterfactual scenarios
one might want to examine by approximating the stickiness firms face in deciding whether
to move.
6 The choice probabilities in the nested logit require another parameter that measures the importance of the
nest, which we denote λk for nest Bk . If we denote the profit πi j t = Vi jt + i j t , the choice probabilities for
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5.1 Results for the Nested logit
The results for the nested logit relocationmodel are analogous to those of the previous section,
with the addition that as we now model the decision to relocate or stay, we can estimate a
moving cost constant, θ1, which is incurred onlywhen a firm decides to relocate, and a nesting
parameter λmove. We also calculate elasticities separately for domestic and foreign firms. We
use a similar formula to calculate individual elasticities ηi j t as before,7 and denote by I j
(resp. I cj ) the set of all firms originating in country j (resp. outside of country j). Then we
can define the country j level elasticities η jdomestic and η
j
f oreign as:
η
j
domestic =
d log
(∑
i∈I j Pi j t
)
d log Price_elec
=
∑
i∈I j Pi j tηi j t∑
i∈I j Pi j t
η
j
f oreign =
d log
(∑
i∈I cj Pi j t
)
d log Price_elec
=
∑
i∈I cj Pi j tηi j t∑
i∈I cj Pi j t
By taking aweighted sum of each η jdomestic across all the countries j, we arrive at an aggregate
elasticity:
ηdomestic =
∑
i∈I1 Pi1tηi1t +
∑
i∈I2 Pi2tηi2t + . . . +
∑
i∈IJ Pi J tηi J t∑
i∈I1 Pi1t +
∑
i∈I2 Pi2t + . . . +
∑
i∈IJ Pi J t
and use an analogous definition for η f oreign .
These results are reported in Table 6 and shown in Fig. 4.8 The elasticity for domestic firms
ηdomestic is very low, indicating that domestic firms are rather un-responsive to increases in
their domestic energy prices when deciding whether or not to relocate. This is due to having
such a large share of firms in each domestic country that do not relocate in a multinomial
logit specification. On the other side, this model allows us to also study the responsiveness
of foreign firms to domestic energy prices, to give a sense of how much a country might be
able to attract foreign firms by having lower energy prices. This responsiveness is indicated
by η f oreign , which corresponds to the results from the Conditional Relocation Model from
the previous section. Our estimates range from 0.58 to 0.76, suggesting there is a higher
Footnote 6 continued
choosing an alternative i which is in nest Bk then take the form Pi jt =
e
Vi j t
λk
⎛
⎝∑
j∈Bk e
Vi j t
λk
⎞
⎠
λk−1
∑K
l=1
⎛
⎝∑
j∈Bl e
Vi j t
λl
⎞
⎠
λl
. Note that
if the estimated nesting parameter λk is one, the choice probabilities and the model reduce to the standard
logit that we used before. As the nesting parameter goes to zero, this indicates the importance in the nesting
of alternatives, and signals that the more flexible nested logit captures a more realistic substitution pattern.
7 Elasticities in the nested logit are given by
[(
1 − Pi jt
) +
(
1−λmove
λmove
) (
1 − Pi jt |Bk
)]
βprice Price_elec jt .
Note again that with λmove equal to 1, the elasticities would be exactly the same as the standard logit case
used before.
8 We also estimated the unconditional relocation model without the nesting structure. Because the nesting
parameter λmove is different than 1, suggesting a standard logit is mis-specified, we present only the nested
model logit. Elasticities were very similar under both models, the main difference was that the nested logit
estimated smaller moving costs, while the i.i.d. structure of the error term in the standard logit drove the
moving cost estimate to be larger in magnitude.
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Fig. 4 Mean profit terms from nested logit
responsiveness to variations in energy costs in terms of attracting foreign firms that have
already decided to move.
Table 7 includes robustness checks on what is assumed regarding the outside share. With
N firms making a location decision each period, N= 800, 1000, and 1500 correspond to an
outside share of .93, .94, and .96 respectively. Although the point estimates do vary, the
elasticities remain with a reasonable range, with for example the elasticity on foreign firms
remaining high but below unity (from 0.71 to 0.89).
6 Firm Heterogeneity
It seems likely that, at themargin, there are some firms aremore responsive to the cost burdens
imposed by environmental regulations. For example, some heavily polluting manufacturing
plants may be more likely to relocate in response to new regulations, and such firms may
face a tradeoff between upgrading to cleaner technology or relocating, and large differences
in national regulatory environments can have a big influence on these decisions. Moreover,
heterogeneity among industries in levels of pollution and moving costs may result in a
heterogeneous response to increases in energy costs across specific industries. Similarly, one
can speculate that firms which operate in more energy-intensive sectors are more likely to
respond to increases in energy costs than those in less energy-intensive sectors. While our
data are not particularly well-suited to investigate firm heterogeneity in great detail, we can
make use of 2 digit sector codes to create a set of high energy intensive industries and a set
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Table 6 Nested logit models: whether to move and where to move
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Distance (100 thous. km) −5.8897** −8.3682** −8.4451** −8.7546**
(1.8525) (1.9558) (1.9696) (2.0133)
EU membership 0.147** 0.1475** 0.1644**
(0.066) (0.0662) (0.0704)
Electricity price (US cents/kWh) −0.5782** −1.3273** −1.3623** −1.29995**
(0.2858) (0.4713) (0.482) (0.4818)
GDP −0.02 0.3315
(0.0423) (0.3383)
GDP per cap −0.3294
(.3352)
Language 0.0903** 0.0907** 0.0932**
(0.0309) (0.031) (0.0316)
Tax rate −0.1084
(0.1974)
Trade −0.0802
(0.0749)
ηdomestic 0.0023 0.0052 0.0054 0.0051
η f oreign 0.5945 0.8735 0.8918 0.8247
λmove 0.0984 0.1541 0.1549 0.1596
Moving costs −3.6329 −3.9758 −3.9786 −4.0099
N 1500 1500 1500 1500
The labelling of Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 refers solely to which right-hand side variables are
included in the estimation
Significance results are p ≤ .05 is ** and .05 < p ≤ .1 is *
of low energy intensive industries.9 That is, we use energy intensity information to partition
our data set.
We account for sectoral heterogeneity in energy intensity by adding an interaction of the
electricity price with an indicator for being in an energy intensive sector. The profit function
from the previous sections then takes the form:
πi j t = δ j + (β1 + γ × INTENSEi )Price_elec jt +β2GDP jt +β3Tradei j t + θ ′MCi j + i j t
(7)
where INTENSEi is an indicator for firm i belonging to an energy intensive sector, so that we
now estimate an extra parameter γ which reflects the importance of the electricity price for
firms in energy intensive sectors, beyond the effect for firms that are not in energy intensive
sectors.
9 This categorization is derived based on the DECC (2012) Annual Industrial Energy Consumption Tables
for the UK. This source has total annual electricity consumption information per sector expressed in ‘000
MWh/year, which was divided by the number of enterprises in the sector in the UK as reported in Eurostat.
This is a crude statistic as electricity consumption varies considerably within the two digit level sector classifi-
cation used here; therefore we create two groupings, one includes energy intensive industries and another–the
remainder of sectors. Energy intensive industries include pharmaceuticals, paper, electronics, chemicals, basic
metals, tobacco products and coke and refined petroleum products.
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Table 7 Nested logit model: robustness check using differing values of N
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Distance (100 thous. km) −4.9569** −6.0603** −12.8038**
(2.1794) (2.0701) (2.3983)
EU membership 0.0306 0.0615 0.2662**
(0.0316) (0.0448) (0.0857)
Electricity price (US cents/kWh) −0.6279** −0.8237** −1.9777**
(0.3621) (0.392) (0.5769)
GDP −0.0095 −0.0126 −0.0428
(0.0251) (0.0302) (0.0605)
Language 0.0488* 0.0624** 0.1409**
(0.0252) (0.027) (0.0416)
ηdomestic 0.0048 0.0051 0.0082
η f oreign 0.7171 0.7718 0.8964
ηmove 0.0886 0.1081 0.2247
Moving costs −2.9831 −3.3153 −4.3116
N 800 1000 1500
The labelling of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 refers to the assumed size of N
Significance results are p ≤ .05 is ** and .05 < p ≤ .1 is *
The results are presented in Table 8. With only 166 firms in energy intensive sectors,
we are not able to find statistically significant estimates for the interaction effect. The point
estimate is, however, large and in the expected direction, indicating that energy intensive
sectors are more responsive to energy prices. Indeed this is reflected in the corresponding
elasticities, where low energy intensive firms have an elasticity around 0.4, while the energy
intensive sectors firms have an elasticity of 0.8. A larger dataset or one with more detailed
firm characteristics such as sector beyond the two digit NACE code would be required to
investigate this question more precisely.
7 Conclusions
The Pollution Havens Hypothesis suggests that increasingly-strict environmental policies
act as a dis-incentive to firms to locate in a given country. If this effect is significant, then
increasingly-strict climate change policies in Europe would simply result in the displacement
of polluting emissions to areas of the world with less-severe environmental regulation. One
way of thinking about these effects is through the costs of inputs to production. In this study
we are able to statisticallymeasure a relationship between a proxy for energy costs—end-user
electricity prices–and location choice for manufacturing plants which have the possibility of
moving into, or out of, or within, European Union countries.
Themagnitude of the effects thatwefindof electricity prices onfirm’s re-location decisions
are significant, although the elasticity of location choice with respect to electricity prices is
always less than or equal to one.We also find an interesting asymmetry in the effects of rising
electricity prices. A country can try to attract a relocating foreign firm by lowering production
costs through having less strict environmental policies, and this will affect the responsiveness
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Table 8 Check for firm heterogeneity, conditional model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Distance (100 thous. km) −60.5193** −55.7853** −55.8921** −55.9389**
(7.6614) (7.8085) (7.8299) (7.8432)
EU membership 0.1063 0.1043 0.1074
(0.2667) (0.2669) (0.2685)
Electricity price high intensity −4.0046 −3.8089 −3.8006 −3.7978
(2.7081) (2.7057) (2.7034) (2.7034)
Electricity price (US cents/kWh) −4.4872** −5.0604** −5.1191** −5.0723**
(2.4536) (2.5647) (2.5851) (2.6265)
GDP −0.0498 −0.0292
(0.2784) (0.3464)
Language 0.533** 0.5328** 0.5323**
(0.1719) (0.1719) (0.172)
Trade −0.0456
(0.4546)
η
hign
price 0.7796 0.8143 0.819 0.8145
ηlowprice 0.4371 0.4921 0.4979 0.4934
N 634 634 634 634
The labelling of Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 refers solely to which right-hand side variables are
included in the estimation
Significance results are p ≤ .05 is ** and .05 < p ≤ .1 is *
of a foreign firm with an estimated mean elasticity of η f oreign ≈ 0.7. On the other hand,
a country might fear that imposing environmental regulation will cause domestic firms to
leave. However, we found a very low responsiveness of domestic firms to increasing energy
costs, with an elasticity of ηdomestic ≈ .005. This marked asymmetry is partly a consequence
of the multinomial logit specification and the resulting expression for elasticities: since most
domestic firms remain at home, Pi jt is high for domestic firms, and therefore the elasticity
βprice Price_elec
(
1 − Pi jt
)
will be small, while the opposite occurs for the foreign firms.
But the asymmetry is also consistent with our assumed firm decision process. In the short
to medium term, if most domestic firms are not considering relocation, it would take a large
change in input prices in order for them to even consider incurring the fixed costs of a
re-location. In the long term, for capital intensive industry, once the asset lifetime expires,
relocation fixed costs would be lower and the chance of relocation would be marginally
higher. By contrast, from the perspective of home country i, there are many foreign firms (the
domestic firms in all other countries), and if even a small number are considering relocation
from each country, in sum this group of relocating firms may be sizeable. Having decided it
is worthwhile to incur the fixed moving costs, they may be more sensitive to small changes
in energy prices in potential destination country j in choosing where to relocate.
We also found that the responsiveness of firms to higher energy costs in terms of the
probability of them re-locating was about twice as large for high energy users than for
low energy users. This suggests one reason why governments might want to find means of
reducing the financial burden of climate policies on high-energy use sectors.
We are not able to determine whether countries are setting environmental standards below
socially efficient levels in order to attract and maintain firms, as this would require some
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measure of the social cost of pollution. Particularly in the case of climate change, these costs
are hard to estimate. But our results indicate that countries should not expect many domestic
firms to leave in the short term as a result of regulations that lead to increases in the costs
of production for manufacturing firms. It may, however, be modestly more difficult to attract
foreign firmswhen domestic climate policy is strengthened in awaywhich increases end-user
energy prices. If this is a significant concern of policy-makers, then this would place more
importance on a coordinated regulatory frameworks across countries.
Finally, it is important to note that the effects of variations in electricity prices were
explicitly modelled here, not the effects of price changes for all energy inputs which firms
make use of. This would clearly be a potentially interesting extension to the paper. Since
a carbon tax would also affect the prices of fuels which can substitute for electricity as
inputs to production, our results do not show the full effects on carbon leakage or on firm
location decisions of such a tax. Moreover, we do not model the link between environmental
policy-setting and electricity prices, which is important since, as noted, many factors jointly
determine these energy prices. The dynamics of the problem are also not studied in this paper,
apart from an investigation of the effects of using lagged prices. Given the typical investment
cycles of particularly high-energy intensity industries, then over the longer term (say >20
years), we might see much bigger effects on relocation decisions of sustained differences in
wholesale energy prices. However, the data set does not enable us to test for such long-run
dynamics. Finally, one might anticipate that firm size would co-determine the probability
that a firm would choose to re-locate in response to higher energy costs. Again, this is not
investigated in the present paper.
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